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Learning to Speak 
Lance Ashdown, Groningen 
Rush Rhees’s Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Dis-
course constitutes both an extension and a critique of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The theme of the book is 
the question that Rhees argues was central to Wittgen-
stein throughout his career: what it means to say some-
thing. While working through this problem, Rhees argues 
that the Investigations picture of acquiring language 
through training is misleading. To my knowledge, this 
discussion has so far received no serious attention from 
Wittgenstein scholars. In this paper I shall bring together 
Rhees’s various remarks into a coherent critique in an 
effort to make clear its importance. 
The concept of “training” is central to the conception of 
language-acquisition found in Wittgenstein’s middle and 
later philosophy. In the Brown Book, Wittgenstein writes 
that the training of a child to speak is comparable to train-
ing an animal. He asks us to “imagine a society” in which 
“the only system of language” involves requesting and 
delivering building materials (77). On the question of lan-
guage-acquisition, Wittgenstein writes: 
The child learns this language from the grown-ups by 
being trained to its use. I am using the word “trained” in 
a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an 
animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by 
means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike 
(77). 
Wittgenstein does not say that an animal could learn 
language, but that the child learns language in a way that 
is “strictly analogous” to the way that an animal is trained. 
We gain insight into human language-acquisition by re-
flecting on the system of reward and punishment used to 
modify animal behavior. 
Rhees criticizes the Brown Book view. First, animal 
training does not seem analogous to human language-
acquisition, for an animal cannot say anything. For exam-
ple, we can train a “very intelligent parrot,” but unlike a 
child, it will never be able to do anything other than imitate 
sounds that it has heard. Rhees’s point “is that if [the 
language learner] can speak he has got something tell you 
or ask you” (187). Not only is an animal unable to say 
something, but there is a sense in which the animal does 
not understand commands, either. Rhees imagines a 
ploughman training a horse to respond to orders. The 
horse may stop when its master says “whoa” and go when 
he says “gee-up,” but the horse does not know what “go-
ing” or “stopping” mean. Why not? Because “to know that, 
he would have to be able to use the language himself” 
(132). For example, the horse should know what its master 
is talking about even when he is not shouting orders, know 
what an order is even when not being directed to the 
horse, and distinguish going from stopping in the case of 
other horses (132-3). Furthermore, if a child is trained to 
speak, then it can train others when it grows up just as it 
was trained. If a person trains an animal, however, then 
the animal cannot grow up to train other animals. The 
difference between a trained animal and a child who can 
say something is so great as to render the analogy un-
helpful.  
Second, Wittgenstein’s analogy suggests that learning to 
speak is something like learning a highly complicated form 
of animal behavior. The difference between human beings 
and animals cannot be accounted for in a sublimed con-
cept of behaviorial complexity. For example, Rhees dis-
cusses the importance of “and so on” for learning rules, 
and says that if we make it central for an account of learn-
ing to speak then “[i]t is not even like Abrichtung, in the 
sense that when it is learning to ask questions and answer 
them, you cannot be brought to this by being trained to it, 
as a dog might be trained to obey orders or do compli-
cated tricks” (242). The point is that if speaking were a 
complex animal behavior, then saying or asking something 
would become a matter of “complicated tricks,” which 
would raise the question why dogs could not learn to do it. 
Is it because they are not intelligent enough? The differ-
ence shows in the asymmetry between human and animal 
ways of living, in the fact that speech is internal to human 
society but not to associations of animals. It is within the 
context of a community of speakers that the concept “be-
havior” has its sense. Speech is not added to behavior; 
rather, what we mean by behavior is shown in our speech. 
Because the animal way of living does not involve speak-
ing, it does not make sense to train an individual animal to 
do it. 
Unlike in the Brown Book, one of Wittgenstein’s principal 
goals in the Investigations is to reveal the temptations and 
inadequacy of the Augustinian picture of language. One 
aspect of this picture is thinking that learning language 
presupposes understanding an explanation of words given 
within language.1 In contrast, Wittgenstein depicts lan-
guage-acquisition as training in the of use expressions. 
The explicit comparison between animal and human train-
ing found in the Brown Book is now absent, which is not to 
say that it does not subtly inform Wittgenstein’s view. 
Speaking of the examples in § 1, Wittgenstein writes: “A 
child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns 
to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, 
but training” (§ 5). An important aspect of this training is 
the ostensive teaching of words (§ 6). Wittgenstein goes 
on to give examples of being trained to ask what some-
thing is called (§ 27), read a table in response to a com-
mand (§ 86), manipulate equations (§ 189), react to sign-
posts (§ 198), and generally follow rules and obey orders 
(§ 206). Rhees writes: 
We bring in the idea of Abrichtung (training) in order to 
show how it is possible to teach people to understand 
what is said: without explaining what it means: in order 
to get over the difficulty that we cannot teach them the 
meanings of words by explaining the meanings of words: 
or teach them how to use words, by explaining to them 
how words are used (51). 
It is also important to show, as Wittgenstein does, that 
learning language involves learning rules. We learn the 
rules when we learn the expressions. Rhees writes: 
If you ask what we learn when we learn the language, 
the easiest answer seems to be, “the rules”; just as that 
seems to be the easiest answer when you ask what we 
learn when we learn the meaning of a word (241). 
The idea of the rules brings out the importance of “and so 
on,” of knowing how to go on, as well as the notion of 
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correct and incorrect. For Rhees, the problem comes when 
training and “learning the rules” dominates an account of 
learning language. But why should it not dominate the 
account, and if it should not dominate, then what should 
we emphasize in its place? 
First, Rhees argues that learning to speak is not learning 
the meanings of expressions, nor is it learning the expres-
sions themselves. The problem is that “a creature might 
learn to react correctly to a number of words without ever 
learning to speak with people” (51). It then looks as if an 
animal could learn to do it. The notion of "reacting 
correctly" is a way to get around the problem that learning 
the meaning of a word seems to be a more advanced type 
of language-acquisition. Rhees writes: “‘What is it you 
teach him when you teach him the meaning of the word 
“pain”?’ is not like ‘What is it you teach him when you 
teach him to speak?’” (64). It seems that learning to speak 
could not be learning the meanings of expressions, as if it 
were like learning an additional language, so it must be 
something else: learning the use of expressions. The 
problem is that teaching the use of expressions would only 
be helpful to someone who could speak already (50, 62). 
In other words, learning expressions is a higher order of 
language-acquisition: a child can understand an explana-
tion of expressions only if she can already use some 
expressions, but a child can only be taught expressions – 
in the sense that she can learn from an adult what to do 
with them or how to use them – if she can already say 
something and understand what is said. 
In Rhees’s view, Wittgenstein did not want to say that 
when we teaching someone to speak “we teach him the 
meanings of various expressions,” but at the same time 
“he still clung to the idea that we teach him particular 
expressions” (62). Certainly, it is confused to say that 
teaching someone to speak is like teaching them a par-
ticular skill analogous to learning to use a particular ex-
pression (65). Rhees assumes the role of interlocutor: 
What is the objection to saying that the learning of these 
various expressions is learning to speak? There is not 
any single thing which is learning to speak, comparable 
to learning the use of any of these expressions. But 
knowing the use of various such expressions – being 
able to use them on the occasions in which they arise in 
connection with other people – that is speaking (74). 
The problem with the view that speaking is “knowing the 
use of various such expressions” is that “if [someone] can 
speak, he can go on to say and ask other things” (74). 
What can Rhees mean here? Suppose that we compare 
expressions to tools. I may give a child a box full of tools 
and show him how to use them, but we cannot infer from 
this fact that he will learn how to use tools that are not in 
the box. Rhees is pointing to the fact that learning to speak 
involves learning new expressions and saying new things. 
The view of language-acquisition as learning the use of 
expressions makes it difficult to see how the child can go 
on in this way. 
A second problem with training is that it construes 
learning to speak as a systematic activity. The model is a 
classroom exercise, e.g., teaching a child the names of 
objects (191). The teacher writes or says something, the 
pupil imitates her, and then the pupil is able to continue on 
his own. But does it make sense to suggest that children 
learn to speak in this way? Rhees writes: “Learning to 
speak is not learning ‘how people do it’: as though one 
might be guided through the motions of a drill until one 
was able to go on with it alone” (70). How could a conver-
sation, for example, be something that a child could go on 
with alone? We may answer that a child could be drilled in 
how to talk with people. In a discussion of “the difference 
between a jumble of meaningful sentences and a sensible 
discourse,” Rhees says that the difference is 
something that [the child] learns, although it is not 
something you can teach him by any sort of drill, as you 
might teach him the names of objects. I think he gets it 
chiefly from the way in which the members of his family 
speak to him and answer him. In this way he gets an 
idea of how remarks may be connected, and of how 
what people say to one another makes sense (191). 
Why not teach a child “how to carry on a conversation”? It 
is absurd to imagine teaching a child a specific conversa-
tion, for example, teaching a child a particular set of re-
sponses about the weather. “I will say that it is raining 
outside, and you will respond that you want to go outside 
anyway, and then tomorrow we will have this conversa-
tion.” If we cannot train a child to carry on a particular 
conversation, however, then perhaps can we train a child 
to understand what a conversation about the weather is, 
what a conversation about chores is, etc. On this sugges-
tion, we can train the child how to conduct various types of 
conversations. This view runs into the problem of logical 
reversal: we can train a child in what it makes sense to say 
in a given type of conversation only if the child already 
knows what a conversation of this sort is.2 For example, 
we could not teach a child how to conduct a conversation 
about the weather unless a child already knew what it was 
to have a conversation about the weather; but if the child 
knows this, then what would we teach him? We can say 
more generally that it is not drills and exercises that make 
speech possible, but speech that makes drills and exer-
cises possible.  
Third, the idea of training suggests that we learn to 
speak through imitation. For example, a child hears her 
brother asking “Is dinner ready?” and then asks this ques-
tion herself. She hears her brother say “Yes” when asked 
whether he is hungry, and so learns to say “Yes” when 
asked the same question. Could we learn to speak by 
imitating what is said by others? Rhees writes: 
[I]s there something misleading in the suggestion that 
learning to ask questions and to answer them is some-
thing like learning how the game is played? For if it were 
like this then you ought to be able to show a person how 
to ask questions and to answer them. Can I show you 
what you have to learn? I do not deny that imitation does 
play a role; that if the child did not watch and listen to 
other people speaking and asking questions, he would 
never have learned to do that himself. All the same, 
there is a difference between his imitating the questions 
which they are asking, and his asking a question himself 
when he really wants to know something (243). 
His point is that it must make sense to ask a child in cer-
tain circumstances, “Do you really mean that or are you 
just imitating what your brother said?” An imitated question 
is logically parasitic on a genuine question, and it is the 
genuine question that the child must learn to make as he 
learns to speak. Rhees writes: “If someone learns to 
speak, he does not just learn to make sentences and utter 
them, nor to react to orders either. He learns to say 
something” (49). Hence, it is not as if the child can observe 
                                                     
2 The interloctur does suggest at one point that we could describe different 
sorts of conversations and say of one who has learned to speak that “he has 
learned to do that sort of thing” (64). Rhees says that this remark is all right so 
long as we do not think of it as going through the motions, i.e., learning to 
respond in appropriate ways. “The difference between going through the 
motions and really speaking is like the difference between going through the 
motions and really suffering” (64). 




the adults speaking, and then say the same things that 
they do and in this way be speaking himself. It is not like 
picking up the rules of a game by watching what the play-
ers do and then imitating them. Rhees writes: “The child 
may learn to play ‘Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker’s man’ 
with its hands, and so forth, joining in with the adults; but 
learning to speak with them is something different from 
that” (177). 
Fourth, the notion of training implies a distinction be-
tween the training period and subsequent time when the 
pupil is able to use his training. For example, a worker is 
trained to run a metal working machine, and then goes on 
to use the machine to fabricate parts after the training is 
complete. Against this view of language-acquisition, Rhees 
writes: 
Learning the language is not what enables you to speak. 
(‘Before he can speak he must learn the language.’) (47) 
Rhees’s point is that an internal relation exists between 
learning to speak and speaking, whereas an external 
relation exists between being trained to run a machine and 
making something with it. In the latter case, we can imag-
ine that the worker receives the training, i.e., learns to use 
the machine, but never gets the chance to fabricate parts 
with it: perhaps he is assigned to a different job. We could 
imagine him lamenting, “Why did you train me if you did 
not want me to make anything?” In contrast, it would not 
make sense to say that a child learned to speak, but never 
got the chance to say anything. The child could not say, 
“Why did you train me to speak if you did not want me to 
say anything?” The child learns to speak as its speaks. 
The criteria for a child’s having learned to speak is telling 
someone something, asking a question, replying to a 
question, and so forth. 
Fifth, the notion of training implies that we could learn to 
understand what is said, but renders it mysterious how 
misunderstandings are possible. Rhees remarks that 
different “ways of speaking” go with different practices 
such as law or construction. When we learn how to talk in 
these contexts, then  
we learn what it makes sense to say. And the sense in 
which I may misunderstand what you say – not just fail 
to understand it. [A person] learns to speak when he is 
able to do this. And this is not like learning a technique.
  
Wittgenstein seems to think you could learn to under-
stand by Abrichtung, and understand in a way that does 
not yet allow for misunderstanding. In that case, I do not 
think it is understanding what is said (77). 
Assume the example of a child’s misunderstanding. A child 
goes trick-or-treating at Halloween and is greeted at the 
door by an adult holding a plastic pumpkin filled with 
candy. The adult says “Here is your treat,” and the child 
grabs the handle and tries to pull the whole container away 
rather than an individual candy. The child did not com-
pletely fail to understand what was said in the way that it 
would had the adult asked for the child’s interpretation of 
the Tractatus; rather, the adult’s remark could be under-
stood in more than one way, and the child took it the 
wrong way. Rhees’s point is that learning to understand 
allows for misunderstanding a particular remark, but train-
ing in a technique does not allow for misunderstanding 
how it is applied – the pupil either masters the technique or 
not. Of course, we may be trained to do something, and 
can say that we understand what we have been trained to 
do; but it is nonsense to say that we have been trained to 
understand speech, since understanding speech involves 
understanding, misunderstanding, and half-understanding 
what is said. Could we be trained to half-understand what 
is said? 
It is impossible in this brief space to do justice to the 
depth and subtlety of Rhees’s critique, for to do so I would 
have to set his remarks within the broader context of his 
criticisms of Wittgenstein’s analogies of games and institu-
tions. Nevertheless, I hope to have given an accurate 
account of Rhees’s discussion, and made clear why I think 
that it is important. 
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